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Abstract 
Since the February 20 movement in 2011, Morocco has not witnessed large waves of 
political activism from its young population. However, Moroccan youth are not inactive citizens, 
and it would be a mischaracterization to call young Moroccans apolitical or disinterested. Rather, 
Moroccan youth are finding new ways to interact with political and social issues. With the increase 
in access to the Internet over the last fifteen years, social media has become an important forum for 
Moroccan youth, who have often felt marginalized from more traditional forms of political 
participation like unions and political parties. This research explores the ways that Moroccan youth 
use political activism on social media to confirm and challenge their identities, looking specifically 
at the cultural and political contexts that define the way young Moroccans create and view content. 
Using the World Values Survey, Power 2 Youth research, and qualitative interviews, this research 
finds that while Moroccans under the age of 29 are limited in their political activity in traditional 
methods, they use social media as a forum to express their activist leanings and feelings toward 
current events, while still maintaining a careful awareness of their commentary on and relationship 
toward the state.  
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As the world remains home during the 2020 COVID-19 crisis, individuals on all parts of 
the globe are turning to their cell phones for updates on the pandemic, communication with family 
and friends, and mindless scrolling to keep busy in a time where everything seems uncertain. The 
dependence on social media and the Internet is not a new phenomenon, but is heightened in a time 
when it has been forced to become a primary mode of communication for the masses. Besides its 
more rudimentary uses like photo sharing and status updates, social media has played an important 
role in giving voice to individuals who may not be able to speak in the public sphere. Based on the 
relative anonymity the Internet offers as well as the little perceived consequence tied to Internet 
interaction, it has been found that individuals are often likely to express their true selves more 
quickly and effortlessly on social media platforms (Bargh, McKenna, and Fitzsimmons 2002).  
When looking at the Moroccan context, and more broadly the Arab world, we see that 
individuals are, and have been, using social media for these reasons. Two important processes that 
occur during interaction with social media are judgmental social comparison and informational 
social comparison, which relate to the ways individuals use social media to reflect on their own 
identity and to the information they receive about others and events (Yang, Holden, and Carter 
2018). When applying these two factors to the Moroccan context, it can be said that Moroccan 
youth use the Internet and social media to collect and create information, but also to compare 
themselves to other youth in their activities both on and off the Internet. Based on these 
fundamental principles of understanding identity on social media, this research will further explore 
how youth political activism on social media confirms and challenges Moroccan youth identities, 
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especially focusing on the context of Morocco as a hybrid regime with a population weary of 
political efficacy weary of what they perceive as a low level of political efficacy.  
According to a National Democratic Institute (NDI) study on Moroccan youth, only 31% 
expressed confidence in the government, with that number dropping to a 13% trust in political 
parties and parliament (Zuidema, 2017). Despite this, or perhaps because of perceived corruption 
and marginalization, the voter turnout among youth, and the Moroccan population in general, is 
chronically low and the degree of faith in the efficacy of government is often lower than that. In 
addition to a lack of confidence in governmental systems, particularly due to the nature of the 
hybrid regime, youth in Morocco also find issues with social services and educational resources 
that are available to them. Although there is a separation between Moroccan youth and traditional 
politics, they are becoming involved in politics in other ways – largely on social media and other 
Internet platforms. On social media, youth have been able to create their own version of and forum 
for activism, just as they did during Morocco’s February 20th Revolution (Radi, 2017). As of now, 
Moroccan activism on social media has continued despite increased policing and repression of 
speech. It will be interesting to track as those elements come to a head, as Morocco nears another 
democratic election and individuals turn to their phones for information and activism as the 








Identity Processes on the Internet 
Integral to understanding the motivations and limitations of youth political activism is the 
concept of identity. Identity is understood as the self-definitions that represent the various 
meanings attached to oneself (Hegtvedt and Johnson 2018). An individual's identity is not only 
formed, but also maintained, in constant interaction with others and the environment. Thus it is 
often said that identity is not how one views oneself, but rather, how one views how others view 
oneself. Though confusing in wording, when broken down the meaning is simple: our identity is 
dependent largely on how we perceive the ways that other people see us. Traditionally, research on 
identity formation has focused largely on in-person, face-to-face interaction. As new technology 
and social media becomes more prevalent in day to day life, new research has surfaced on the way 
identity formation differs when interaction takes place on Internet forums. 
Seidman (2014) argues along this line of thought that the self is multi-faceted, and that 
each individual has both an actual self and an ideal self. While the actual self is how we currently 
see and present ourselves, the ideal self is who we want to be and how we want to be seen. 
Somewhere between these aspects lies the true self, which is made up of the qualities that 
individuals possess but don’t activate or express in everyday life. Oftentimes, these are traits that 
one would want to have validated by others, but are unsure how to express in regular interaction 
(Seidman 2014). Research into social media usage has led to the conclusion that social media 
might be a forum for the expression of this true self.  
In their research on the activation of true self on the Internet, Bargh et al. (2002) argue that 
the internet provides a unique opportunity for individuals to be relatively anonymous and free of 
Jaloza 7 
traditional societal constraints. The costs and risks of social sanctions are decreased, though this 
concept needs to be explored more in terms of the political risks that can be incurred from 
discussion on the Internet. Traditional barriers to expressing oneself like identity disconfirmation 
and judgement from peers may be lessened when interaction in non-traditional forums like social 
media (Bargh et al. 2002). 
 Social media provides opportunity for belonging and self-presentation, both factors that 
are integral to the development of self. As individuals, we desire our identity to be approved of and 
confirmed by others, a process called self-verification, and social media networks allow for an 
instant feeling of confirmation that may allow individuals to more openly express themselves 
(Seidman 2014). Social media, which has continued to become more prevalent in the day to day 
life of individuals around the world, is used for socializing, entertainment, status seeking, and 
information (Sabik, Falat, Malagnos 2019). Weaved into each of these motivations are processes 
of judgemental social comparison and informational social comparison, which relate to the ways 
individuals use social media to reflect on their own identity and to the information they receive 
about others and events. These processes allow individuals to participate in more identity 
reflection, which is the active engagement with one’s identity and the attempt to understand 
different facets of self through identity exploration (Yang, Holden, and Carter 2018).  
Social Media Activism  
Research has been conducted on the ways that individuals, most notably youth, have used 
social media around the world to participate in social and political activism. “There has been an 
increased interest in the role social media plays in facilitating activism, particularly since the wave 
of protest that erupted in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008” (Allsop 2016). However, there 
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has been debate about whether social media encourages traditional forms of political involvement 
or hinders political behavior. In their book on the Egyptian Arab Spring protests, Gunning and 
Baron explain a paradox in media usage, that “while social media may facilitate debate, they may 
at the same time discourage offline activism” (Gunning and Baron 2014).  
Though some believe social media provides an excuse for citizens to take the easy route 
through “slacktivism,” others argue that social media acts as a facilitator for more traditional 
methods of political activism, like voting or protesting (Allsop 2016). Three common features 
explain why social media is able to be a helpful mediator in protest: social media provides a low 
cost option to share content to those who have access, can reach many people at one time, and can 
create an interpersonal connection between the sharers and receivers of content (Larson 2019). In a 
2013 study on Chilean activists on social media, Valenzuela found a relationship between those 
who frequent social media and those who attended street protests, with a significant portion of 
these accrediting their attendance to social media information. He suggests that “social media is a 
tool used for, but not a cause in itself, of political action” (Allsop 2016). Further, he examines 
three main explanations for the relationship between online presence and protest behavior, which 
explain the breadth of usage of social media for political use. Citizens and activists use social 
media for information, for opinion expression, and for activism (Valenzuela 2016).  
Valenzuela’s uses of social media aid in the understanding of active citizenship in the 
modern age, but also fit into the research on the relationship between social media and identity. 
Informational social media usage in the context of activism refers to individuals using social media 
as a source of news, which leads to the informational social comparison that allows individuals to 
draw opinions and relations between personal situations and grievances and that of others (Yang, 
Jaloza 9 
Holden, and Carter 2018). This informational social comparison, combined with relevant 
information about social issues, may be a cause for individuals who use social media to move their 
participation onto the streets. The opinion expression aspect of social activism on the Internet, 
defined as the use of social media to express political opinions, also feeds into this idea and 
subsequently also leads people to participate in activism (Valenzuela 2016). Individuals seek 
verification of their opinions, and through subsequent feelings of solidarity, are more willing to 
take action. The activism relationship between media and participation combines these two ideas, 
as individuals use media for “joining causes and finding mobilizing information” (Valenzuela 
2016). 
Alongside the facilitator role of the Internet in activism movements, “social media is 
fundamentally changing political behavior and challenging existing power structures in society in a 
potentially revolutionary way” (Allsop 2016). In their research on new media in the Middle East, 
Karaguezian and Badine (2013) continue to explore this line of thought. They argue that new 
technologies, including Internet forums and social media, have shaped dynamics of societies, 
shifting away from traditional centralized structures and moving toward a more horizontal 
distribution. This led to shifts in the ways power and information was able to be shared among 
individuals and communities, and played an important role in the social and political changes 
taking place in spaces and institutions outside of the Internet (Karaguezian and Badine 2013). 
The Arab Spring, Youth Activism, and Social Media 
The argument for the “paradigm shift” occurring alongside the rise of new media is 
supported by research on the activism that occured in the 2011 Arab Spring. After the 2008 
financial crisis, civil society in Europe, the Arab world, and South America took to the streets in 
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movements for opportunity and liberation, and societies were “awakening… due to the severe 
nature of the political and economic crises they face” (Cavorta 2012). These protests were given 
nicknames like “The Twitter Revolution” or the “Facebook Revolution” and headlines in 
international newspapers across the world commented on the integral role in social media in these 
protests. In fact, most modern protests have used social media in some way as an organizational 
and informational strategy (Larson 2019). While it is important to note the important role of social 
media in these protests, especially in those during the Arab Spring, it is also necessary to recognize 
that social media can only go so far. Larson argues while the three common features of social 
media – low costs, large audience, and personal sources – can make protests larger and occur more 
often, there need to be other conditions allowing for the protests to take shape (Larson 2019). 
In the case of the Arab Spring, other shifts were happening alongside the rise of social 
media that allowed for widespread protests to occur across the region. Prior to the Arab Spring, 
“with a mixture of repression, co-optation and divide-and-conquer strategies, regimes had virtually 
emptied civil society activism of its counter-power abilities” (Cavorta 2012). Traditional civil 
society groups, in both the liberal and Islamist sectors, were allowed room to operate, but also 
were strengthening the authoritarianism of the regime in the process. The societal uprisings against 
regimes across the Arab world thus did not rise up from these traditional parts of civil society, but 
rather from pockets of activism that existed outside of these spaces. Individual citizens with 
previously little access to mobilize began to come together and use their networks, one of these 
being social media (Cavorta 2012). That these pockets were able to come together in a time of 
desperation “testifies to society’s vitality, even under the repressive authoritarian measures of the 
regimes in power” (Cavorta 2012). 
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In the 2011 Arab Spring protests, youth were an integral subsection of the activated citizens 
who took to the streets protesting for dignity, bread, and freedom. Previously, Arab youth had been 
written off as apolitical and disinterested in the affairs of the state. Youth make up a significant 
portion of the population, but have been known for low turnout and political participation. A study 
in Egypt at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic studies concluded that the majority of 
young people in Egypt, one of the countries that experienced an Arab Spring revolution and period 
of protest, show no interest in politics or political participation. Included in this report was data 
showing that only a slight majority consumed political news regularly, and that an overwhelming 
majority knew little about political policies of different parties. The two main reasons for this lack 
of political interest were determined to be a fear of politics and a lack of family encouragement 
(Lange 2011). 
Yet, despite the previous characterizations of Arab youth, thousands took to the street 
across the Arab World in 2011 and the years following. It is important to note the conditions 
leading to this shift in participation that encouraged this previously marginalized pocket of society 
to take action. As Cavorta (2012) explained, these informal groups were activated because of 
specific events or triggers. As economic growth was improving after the 2008 world wide 
recession, youth were among those left out of the benefits. Arab countries were experiencing 
extremely low reporting rates of accountability and satisfaction among the population. Citizens, 
especially youth, were frustrated with high levels of corruption and low levels of opportunity, 
especially in the job market. This was especially true for young graduates who, after obtaining 
degrees, faced a market with little to no space for them (Ghanem 2016). Most importantly, youth 
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felt excluded from whatever small growth there was, leading to growing frustrations about their 
future. 
Cavorta explains that the lack of traditional interest and affiliation among youth actually 
served as a benefit in the 2011 protests, as the unaffiliated activists were more ideologically 
flexible and thus able to create effective coalitions to come together under a unified front of 
desiring change. Young people, already connected through social media, were able to take to the 
web with enthusiasm to discuss these grievances, and with the closure of free spaces of discussion, 
social media became more and more of a necessity for individuals to discuss their problems. “Once 
the wall of fear crumbled, even the repression seemed to be an incentive to continue with the 
protests,” and soon, thousands took note from the ideas spread on social media and stepped out 
onto the streets (Cavorta 2012). 
February 20 and Morocco’s Arab Spring 
Morocco’s Arab Spring revolution came in the form of February 20, which “kicked off the 
social, economic, and political agenda in 2011” (Radi 2011). The protests were products of 
growing challenges against the regime following rises in unemployment and policy and a 
withdrawal of the state from public services. “The paradox between the skyrocketing costs of 
living and falling income, when available, drove scores of bitter young graduates into poverty, 
unemployment or the practice of a job that neither matched nor valued their university skills” 
(Radi 2011). In addition to social grievances, Moroccan citizens of all ages felt the elections did 
not respond to any real concerns of the people, and youth especially felt under-represented, 
shunning the elections and institutions that encouraged their marginalization. Moroccan students 
had organized previously, with movements starting after independence in 1956 (Mounsif 2018).  
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Students and other protesters took to the street on February 20th, 2011, calling for bread, 
freedom, and social justice. Despite beatings and harassment, protests continued while King 
Mohammed VI declared a commitment to constitutional reform and separation of powers, and 
though the regime never fell, numbers dwindled and opposition silenced as a new constitution was 
written and promises were made to ensure human rights (McManus 2016). The Moroccan 
experience of the Arab Spring, though not resulting in regime change, the movement’s 
introduction of deliberative street politics “offered those engaged in it an opportunity for their 
voices to be heard, to exercise dignified agency in the midst of repressive sociopolitical 
surroundings, and the solidarity of their peers in a shared battle for a more free and equal 
Morocco” (McManus 2016).  
This movement in Morocco initially emerged “from Facebook where it issued its initial 
statement for Moroccans ‘to demonstrate peacefully’”(Radi 2017). Social media continued to have 
an important role through the progression of the protests, as photos and videos of both the 
activities of the protest and flaws of the regimes were posted to the internet with commentary. In 
essence, this strategy, as explained by both Cavorta and Radi, broke the wall of fear among 
citizens, creating a shared identity and group consciousness that social media has the unique 
capabilities of fostering quickly and in such a wide manner. The Internet in February of 2011 also 
allowed for quick dissemination of information and the convergence of opinions, which allowed 
the leaders of the movement to not just trigger mobilization, but also provide a seemingly valid 
alternative to the information of the regime. The youth involved in Morocco’s movement 
benefited, like in other parts of the Arab world, from their relative lack of party sectarianism and 
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leadership battles, which contributed to group solidarity as the movement progressed with an 
organized message. 
Moroccan Youth Activism  
Now, nearly ten years after the February 20th movement, Morocco still faces many of the 
issues that led to the 2011 protests calling for change. Much of the Moroccan population still 
struggles economically, and because the informal work force employs around 2.4 million 
Moroccans, many are left without economic and social protections (Elouazi 2018). There are still 
feelings that there are not enough high quality jobs for the number of graduates of higher 
education, and feelings of doubt towards traditional political institutions remain. Despite the 
continuation of these issues, there has not been recent large scale protest movements to the extent 
of February 20. There have been smaller movements like MALI (Alternative Movement for 
Individual Freedoms), which campaigns for citizens rights to individual freedom. This movement 
has focused its campaigns on social media, beginning as a Facebook group, and since has 
publicized violations of individual freedom and led many campaigns fighting for the protections of 
marginalized groups. 
A possible explanation for the lack of physical expression of grievances by youth in public 
places comes from the repression of speech and action that challenges traditional institutions. 
Despite the adoption of the 2016 Press and Publications Code, which has been framed as a step in 
the right direction for press freedom, nonviolent speech offenses that depict the monarchy 
negatively have continued despite protections. Included in the penal code is the criminalization of 
“causing harm to Islam and the monarchy, giving offense to the king or members of the royal 
family, and inciting against territorial integrity” (Goldstein). Thus, non-traditional media has 
Jaloza 15 
played an important role in modern Moroccan activism, as it has yet to experience the same degree 
of repression as traditional media and protest methods.   
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Methodology 
The research design for this project combines multiple data collection and analysis 
methods. Given the circumstances surrounding COVID-19 and unexpectedly having to return from 
Morocco, field data was unable to be collected in a large scale as was intended. Thus, the bulk of 
the research was no longer able to be first hand data in the form of either survey or interview 
research. In order to still involve primary data in my work and to better understand the current 
situation in Morocco, I opted to conduct a small number of virtual interviews.  
The limited scope of my qualitative research subsequently led to limited sampling 
opportunities. In order to find participants to interview for my research, my advisor Professor 
Mourad Mikinsi connected me with students at the Ibn Tofail University in Kenitra, Morocco. 
After extending the opportunity to students, I received the contact information of five potential 
participants. Upon reaching out and explaining my research and intentions, I heard back from two 
students who were willing to participate via video chat. These interviews were both conducted via 
WhatsApp video chat, and the participants received a basic outline of the questions prior to the 
interview so they could familiarize themselves with the questions and prepare for further 
discussion. Before beginning the interview, I obtained oral consent from each participant and made 
sure they were aware that they could stop at any time. In addition to these two interviews 
conducted over video chat, one additional interview was conducted with a third student from Ibn 
Tofail University. This interview was conducted via email, and along with the questions a written 
consent was also sent to the participant (Appendix 1). 
It was important to recognize my positionality in both the structure of these interviews as 
well as in the content of our discussions, and also note the barriers that existed in conducting this 
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research. To start, I used English as the language of the conversation which, although studied in 
school at a high level, is not the first language of the students that I interviewed. In order to 
alleviate this possible barrier, I sent the questions in advance in order to allow participants time to 
familiarize themselves with the topics. Another issue that came up was that because the 
participants are confined to the home, I wanted to make sure that they were comfortable talking 
about topics such as politics and their social media usage given their location.  
Given the topic of my research, it was important for me to recognize my own biases, as I 
am an American student from a country that has what the West defines as a free and fair 
democracy. In addition, I was only in Morocco for a short period of time and was basing many of 
my assumptions on this limited scope. From my standpoint, it was easy to assume that since the 
system in Morocco is different from my own that it is automatically less representative or 
ineffective. My experience with freedom of speech and speech repression has been widely 
different from that in Morocco, but I wanted to ensure that I was not judging the differences and 
rather looking at how these conditions have affected Moroccan civil society. Despite my own point 
of view and judgments, I hoped to enter into conversations with an open mind and ability to 
recognize that politics and norms are part of a larger social and cultural environment of a place.  
In addition to the two interviews that I conducted, I decided to continue my research by 
analysing prior research and data focusing specifically on the Moroccan experience of youth 
activism and politics. In order to do this, I looked firstly at the World Values Survey in order to 
understand more about the Moroccan political and social context. The World Values Survey is a 
global research project that has looked at the values and beliefs of individuals around the world 
since 1981. The most recent set of data, Wave 6, was collected between 2010 and 2014, and in 
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2011 data was collected in Morocco. It is certainly a limitation that this data is not collected more 
recently, but with many questions pertaining to political participation as well as a large and diverse 
sample size, it is a valuable resource to analyse. The target population for the World Values 
Survey 6 is all people aged 18 years or older residing in private households in each country. The 
World Values survey researchers used representative sampling methods and a stratification scheme 
to adjust for the population and to make the sampling method more efficient and representative. 
When looking at the data from the World Values Survey, I specifically looked at the responses 
from the male and female participants under the age of 29. Out of the total sample size of 1,200 
participants, 491 respondents fall into this age group that I am considering as Moroccan youth. 
Because I was looking only at responses for one age group (those under 29) and the World Values 
Survey country results sheet already included reports divided by gender and age range, I did not 
have to perform cross-tabulations and chi-square tests in order to draw conclusions about youth 
compared to other age groups and to analyse general societal and cultural trends.  
The World Values Survey, while representative of the Moroccan population and covering a 
wide variety of subjects, is dated and does not focus specifically on the population and subject of 
interest to this research study. In order to draw more conclusions upon the specific population of 
youth in Morocco, I looked at the 2016 study titled Power 2 Youth - Youth Activism in Morocco: 
Exclusion, Agency and the Search for Inclusion. This study was conducted by Saloua Zerhouni 
and Azeddine Akesbi from Mohammed V University in Rabat in 2016 in attempts to expand on 
the research of political participation among Moroccan youth, which previously only looked at 
formal participation. The research attempts to explore alternative modes of youth engagement, and 
the factors that promote or inhibit youth participation in politics. The data collected came from 
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qualitative surveys conducted between April and October 2015 in focus groups and interviews in 
Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, and Marrakech. “The focus groups and interviews aimed at examining 
youth’s perceptions about their conditions, identifying factors that promote or limit the 
involvements and participation of young people in the political sphere, and analysis youth agency” 
(Zerhouni and Akesbi 2016). Participants in the study were between the ages of 18 to 30 years old 
that were either currently in university or holders of BA or MA degrees. Though I did not obtain 
the raw data set for analysis, I used the in-depth Power 2 Youth report as an important source of 
data on this topic.  
The limitations due to the COVID-19 crisis and the distance created between myself as 
researcher and the subjects of interest led to this approach to research involving 3 distinct sets of 
data. However, each plays into each other in a way that allows a cumulative understanding of 
youth politics and activism in Morocco. The World Values Survey data set provides background 
and context on the political and social situation in Morocco after the 2011 Arab Spring movement. 
Zerhouni and Akesbi’s 2016 Power 2 Youth research study dives into the issue of youth political 
participation and discusses places of activism like social media. The interviews conducted with 
students from Ibn Tofail University in Kenitra provide supplementary qualitative responses to 
these two larger research studies, as well as providing updated and first hand accounts specifically 
looking at the issue of social media in Moroccan youth activism.   
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Findings and Analysis 
Political Disinterest, or Disillusion - World Values Survey 
Participants of the World Values Survey were asked to indicate how important certain 
aspects of their life are, including family, friends, leisure time, work, religion, and politics. 
Individuals were asked to rank these facets on a scale ranging from “very important” to “not at all 
important.” When asked about religion, 86.6% of respondents under the age of 29 reported that it 
is very important to them, while less than half a percent reported that it is not at all important (Fig 
1). A similar trend followed for the question on family, with 91.9% percent of the 491 young 
Moroccans saying that family is very important in their life. Similar trends occurred for the 
different age groups when asked these same questions (Fig 2). When the question asked about 
politics, the numbers look quite different. Only 7.7% of participants under the age of 29 answered 
that politics were very important to them, and the highest percentage of respondents, 51.5%, said 
that politics are not all important in their lives (Fig 3). For all age groups, politics was much more 
heavily leaning toward the “not at all important” answer than when asked about work, friends, 
family, and religion.  
Participants were also asked about the qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at 
home and were told to mention the ones that they consider especially important. These 
characteristics included determination, religious faith, generosity, obedience, thrift, tolerance and 
respect, imagination, independence, hard work, and responsibility. The group under the age of 29 
prioritized independence, imagination, determination, and self-expression more often than those in 
the 30-49 and the 50+ age groups (Fig 4). Those under the age of 29 were less likely to mention 
obedience or hard work as being important qualities to teach their children. These two sets of 
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questions provide a snapshot of the paradox that is Moroccan youth. Moroccan youth, and Arab 
youth in general, have often been characterized as apolitical, and while only 7.7% of Morocan 
youth reported that politics is very important to them, this number is even lower, 6.8% and 2.0%, 
for those ages 30-49 and 50+ respectively (Fig 3). The lack of overt political interest is not a youth 
problem, but an issue spanning generations and social groups. However, the questions about 
important qualities in some way challenge the narrative of Arab youth adhering to familial and 
parental values. Moroccan’s under the age of 29 mentioned qualities that encourage moving away 
from tradition and standing up for personal values more often than older age groups when asked 
the same question. 
The more recent research showing low numbers of youth membership in political parties is 
supported by the data in the 2011 World Values Survey. In 2016, voter turnout rate for all ages  in 
the national election tapped in at 43% (El Amraoui 2016). Participants were asked about their 
membership status and activity level for a variety of organizations, including political parties. 
94.3% of the 491 Moroccans under the age of 29 reported that they are not a member. Active 
membership was only slightly higher for those in the older age groups, though still quite low (Fig 
5). It must be said, however, that membership in other organizations including charities and 
environmental groups was also reported to be extremely low. Alongside the low numbers of 
membership in political parties, political interest among all age groups was also found to be very 
low. Only 3.3% of the 491 youth participants reported that they were very interested in politics, 
and a majority of the sample reported that they are not at all interested (50.5%) or not very 
interested (31.2%) (Fig 6).  
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With the survey being written and administered in 2011, the questions asking about 
political participation all refer to traditional methods of participation, including strikes, boycotts, 
and petitions. Less than 10% of those under the age of 29 reported having participated in these 
forms of activism, and around the same number answered that they might in the future participate 
in some form of activism. A large percentage, ranging between 70-80% of the participants, 
answered that they would never participate (Fig 7).  
These numbers, though collected in 2011, still remain true as formal methods of political 
participation among all age groups remain low. Another factor that has remained relatively 
standard over time is trust in government. According to a National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
study on youth in Morocco, only 31% expressed confidence in government, and 13% reported that 
they trusted political parties and parliament (Zuidema, 2017). The World Values Study report from 
2011 drew similar conclusions from its sample. Only 4.7% of participants under the age of 29 
reported a great deal of confidence in political parties, and a combined 70% answered they have 
not very much or no confidence at all (Fig 8). While 17.5% expressed confidence in national 
government, the numbers still heavily lean toward little to no confidence (Fig 9). In addition to 
political institutions, confidence and trust of the press is also reportedly low among all age groups, 
but especially those under 29. A measly 12.4% have a great deal of confidence in the press, and a 
54% majority answered “not very much” or “none at all.” (Fig 10).  
This data is integral in understanding the extent of distrust and dissatisfaction with 
government and traditional institutions. In 2011, coinciding with the Arab Spring, it makes sense 
that when asked to judge different types of governing styles, 72.5% of those under 29 said that 
having a democratic political system was very good. This number was significantly higher than the 
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52.6% of those 50 and older who said a democratic system was very good (Fig 11). Young people 
in Morocco have expressed distrust in government and institutions, as well as a desire for 
democratic systems. They have also noted that they believe in independence, perseverance, and 
responsibility, and yet they are not taking part in the political participation that is traditionally 
considered a political responsibility. Thus, they must be active in other ways. 
New Forms of Activism - Power 2 Youth  
The 2016 Power2Youth research study was an attempt to explore these other ways in 
which young people in Morocco are remaining active and interested in politics. According to 
Zerhouni and Akesbi, existing “empirical studies on Moroccan youth are limited in numbers and 
provide only partial answers about youth political attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions of the 
institutional framework” (Zerhouni and Akesbi 2016). The study makes an important point as to 
not make a hard distinction between active and passive and formal and informal participation, but 
rather to look at how youth move in and out of these spaces and modes and create new ways to 
have their voices heard.  
Even before the new 2011 constitution following the February 20 Arab Spring protests, the 
regime created policies and campaigns aimed at encouraging youth to carry out their civic duty and 
vote, and with the voting age lowered to 18 in 2003, youth technically have been given formal 
spaces to participate politically. Despite this, Moroccan youth voting turnout has been relatively 
low, and membership in political parties has been even lower. One of the factors causing this is the 
fragmented party system, which has led to trade unions and further segmentation of formal 
politics, leaving young people to the margins. One space where membership has flourished is in 
associational life, which traditionally has been controlled by the regime promoting and sponsoring 
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pro-regime associations. New voices, many of them from young Moroccans, have come forward in 
the form of human rights and cultural associations. While a 2014 study by the Ministry of Interior 
only shows that 8% of associations are created and led by young people, this number is 
supplemented by the many involvements of youth in clubs and associations at their universities.  
As access to the Internet has increased substantially over the last 15 years, the Internet has 
also become a place of informal activity for youth, who “took advantage of connection tools to 
create new spaces to socialize, network, play and voice their demands and grievances” (Zerhouni 
and Akesbi 2016). The virtual sphere led to a new type of activism, where young activists used 
their critical voices to inform and mobilize others on a variety of issues. The researchers do note, 
however, that the virtual sphere in Morocco is complicated because despite the low barriers to 
entry and access, there are still restrictions by the state. In fact, open discussion on the Internet has 
provided a new way for the government to stifle political activism, to spy on activists and disrupt 
campaigns.  
An important aspect of the Power 2 Youth research was the focus on youth culture and 
youth identity. One of the main struggles that they found participants face is the tension between 
the desire to become more autonomous on one hand and the traditional Moroccan familial 
structures and relations on the other. In addition to the economic tensions this causes many young 
Moroccans, this dichotomy spills into ideological differences as well. One participant explained 
that his parents fear him getting involved in politics, and another explained that his beliefs in 
individual and collective freedoms often cause arguments between him and his more conservative 
parents. Another commonality among youth participants was a feeling of frustration towards the 
many prohibitions in society, and that in society you cannot express yourself freely. Many 
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expressed frustration with the ambiguities in the legal system, noting that it is often opponents of 
the political system that suffer from the arbitrary rulings.  
Youth involved in the research expressed many grievances with the educational system, 
and some even consider this the core reason for social disparities and other issues later in life. One 
of the other issues expressed by participants was unemployment, which is especially high among 
young people. Thus, youth have many reasons to be frustrated with social services and the 
government that provides them. The participants often used the Arabic words ​tahmish​ and ​alkama 
meaning marginalization and oppression respectively to describe “the difficulties and pressures 
they are faced with” (Zerhouni and Akesbi 2016).  
The feelings of disillusionment spread into youth perceptions of and participation in 
politics. Many feel as though elections are manipulated and that weak political parties responsible 
for youth disengagement, as youth feel marginalized from party leadership and are often dismissed 
as young and naive by elites. Youth exclusion from traditional modes of participation “pushes 
some of them to combine their activism within political parties with other modes of participation 
such as social media” (Zerhouni and Akesbi 2016). Participants explained that social networks 
provide an opportunity for information to flow, and for individuals to express themself. This self 
expression aspect of social media put forth by participants supports prior research on the way 
individuals express their identity differently and more openly on the Internet than in face-to-face 
interaction, and as one participant explained, social media “is a good open space with a positive 
effect on freedom” (Zerhouni and Akesbi 2016). Most of the participants in the Power 2 Youth 
research believed in their own agency, and stressed the importance of using their different methods 
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of participation - be it associations, social media posts, or street protests - in bringing about a 
gradual process of change.  
Qualitative Interviews - Understanding Moroccan Youth in 2020 
The data from the three qualitative interviews further explores the topics of youth usage of 
social media and perceptions of others on social media. Each of the participants, a 27 year old 
male, 21 year old male, and 20 year old female, reported that they use social media in their daily 
lives, albeit for different purposes and in search of different content. A commonality among the 
participants was a consistent use of social media, ranging from 2-6 hours a day. Each individual 
noted that they use certain platforms like Whatsapp mainly for communication with friends and 
family. When it came to other popular platforms, like Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook, the 
reasons diversified between the participants. The mentioned usages of social media echo Sabik, 
Falat, and Malagnos 2019 research, which found the main uses of social media to be 
entertainment, status seeking, and information. The Moroccan participants touched mainly upon 
the entertainment and information aspects, with the status seeking and self evaluation occuring on 
a more subconscious level. The mentioned purposes also line up with Valenzuela’s research on 
protest movements, which found that activists mainly use social media for information, opinion 
expression, and activism.  
While one participant noted that he usually uses social media for browsing and to keep 
himself busy when he has free time, the female participant explained that she “uses social media to 
interact with people, and share [her] opinions and beliefs with different people from different 
places with different backgrounds.” The older male participant mentioned that he uses Facebook 
for a variety of different reasons that fit into the research conducted by Zerhouni and Akesbi about 
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Morocco and into the more general research on social media usage. In addition to personal uses 
like updates from his friends and family, he explained that he “follows many pages and accounts 
that share information about social problems in society.” When further probed on examples of 
social issues that he sees on the Internet, he brought up the example of people using social media 
to help bring awareness of certain instances of struggle that a family or individual may face in 
hopes of gaining support. The ability to create solidarity quickly and among a large group is a 
unique feature that the Internet provides in this instance, and the participant’s explanation of 
drawing public attention to individual issues on platforms like the Internet is reminiscent of the 
way that a small event can trigger a large scale movement when enough attention is created. 
Just as in the Power 2 Youth and World Values Survey research, the three participants were 
asked about their involvement with politics, and were asked to discuss further their participation in 
certain forms of political action. Responses varied slightly, though overall there was a low 
involvement in traditional politics by all three participants. The female participant further 
explained her reasoning, noting that due to her father’s work and her uncle’s warnings to her sister, 
who chose to become involved in political discourse, she chose to remove herself from politics for 
her own safety and the safety of those she cared about. She did also note, in a statement that fits 
the data on perceptions of corruption and mistrust toward the government, that “as a person [she] is 
not interested in the politics in Morocco especially [as] things remain the same with voting or not... 
for [her],  politics is just a huge game where citizens are the victims and those who have power are 
the ones controlling everything.” This disillusionment with the government and its lack of 
representation for the marginalized is not a unique experience, but rather something that is 
definitive of the youth experience in Morocco.  
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Another participant furthered these points, explained that it is difficult to get involved in 
politics in Morocco, arguing that there is “no direct access to political parties, [it is] too dangerous 
to get too involved in politics, [and he] knows people who have been persecuted for gathering.” 
Despite this, he is interested in politics, and has attended student gatherings to talk about politics 
on campus. The younger male participant explained that one of his main reasons for having such 
low involvement in protests or other forms of social activism is that the goals are often not aligned 
with the social issues he cares about. One of the main issues he discussed was voter fraud and 
bribery in government, but he says he never sees protests about stuff like this that “actually 
matters.” In fact, he explained that it is hard to find people talking about important issues, even on 
the Internet. Personally, he avoids politics on social media because oftentimes people post fake 
content, or avoid posting topics that really matter because they either fear repression, or worse, 
believe that corruption is still going to continue happening even if they do speak up.  
Conversely, the other male participant noted that when he wants to find out about important 
issues, the Internet is where he goes. Some important issues are hidden from the mainstream 
media, and are often talked about instead on social media. When asked for an example, the 
participant explained how when the government came up with new laws that citizens viewed as 
infringing on freedom of speech, activists took to Facebook to discuss trying to avoid this law 
getting passed. Another example of the usage of social media to discuss controversial issues was 
the use of Facebook to create a campaign against the government decision to add an extra hour to 
the school day. According to the participant, individuals used Facebook to create a unified 
platform meant to reach the government and a larger portion of the population. In addition to the 
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Internet being used to spread information and solidarity, in this instance it was also used as a 
facilitator, allowing frustrated students to organize protests on the street.  
Though the participants noted benefits of social media as a way to express controversial 
topics and be confronted with differences of opinion, they also disclosed the issues they find with 
social media in Morocco. Two of the participants pointed out that the commentary on Facebook is 
often irrelevant, and that in many instances people start fighting in the comment section about 
politics in a disrespectful way. For this reason, all three participants said they use other sources of 
news in addition to social media. The other main issue is the fear of punishment for discussing 
politics too openly. While there is an abundance of social media influencers and channels that 
speak about new laws and issues with the government, they run the risk of arrest for crossing the 
traditional red lines of Moroccan media, mainly talking negatively about the King. One participant 
discussed an instance of a social media being arrested for 5 years for insulting the King while 
discussing a political issue on Facebook live. In this case, the police used an arbitrary accusation to 
arrest the individual, though his real offense was speaking against the King. For this reason, many 
influencers choose to speak anonymously on the Internet, in hopes of spreading information while 
limiting the danger that they put themselves in.  
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Conclusion 
Moroccan youth have been characterized as apolitical by elders, party leaders, and 
researchers. When looking at traditional forms of political participation, this argument may be 
supported. Youth are voting, joining political parties, and protesting in relatively small numbers. 
However, it would be wrong to say that youth are inactive members of society in Morocco. In fact, 
young Moroccans have found new ways to get involved with politics and social issues that extend 
beyond the traditional modes of political participation. This research was an attempt to understand 
the ways in which youth are remaining active in one of these forums, the Internet. Thus, this 
research set out to discover how youth political activism, specifically on social media, confirms 
and challenges Moroccan youth identities. 
Moroccan youth use social media as a forum to express their activist leanings and feelings 
toward current events, while still maintaining a careful awareness of their commentary on and 
relationship toward the state. Young Moroccans expressed that they and their peers worry about 
the content that they post, especially if it is controversial. This applies specifically when it is 
content that speaks negatively on the government, especially the King. Despite worries about 
posting this type of content, many of Moroccan youth turn to social media when looking for news 
and opinions that they cannot find on mainstream media sources. In addition to finding ways to be 
involved in politics on social media, young Moroccans are also becoming politically active 
through associations at their universities and by encouraging conversation with peers. While there 
has not been large scale youth protest like we saw in 2011 with the February 20 movement, youth 
are using social media and their associations to organize thoughts and create group solidarity, and 
in some instances this has led to street action.  
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More research needs to be conducted in order to fully understand the youth situation in 
Morocco. It would be interesting to see if the trends in the limited qualitative research I conducted 
would carry over into research on a larger and more diverse sample size of Moroccan youth. In 
addition, as the next wave of World Values Surveys are being completed, it would be valuable to 
see how responses have changed since 2011, especially considering the many social, economic, 
political, and technological developments that have occured in the last 10 years.  
There were many limitations to this project, many of them due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
While this has created many personal challenges, it has also provides an interesting opportunity for 
further research. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the world will continue to be faced with 
lasting economic and social difficulties and changes. It will be interesting to see how this pans out 
in Morocco, especially when looking at the youth issue. One of the triggers for the Arab Spring 
protests in 2011 was economic struggles and unemployment, which is a major possibility looking 
forward. Thus, it will be important to watch as the world recovers, and see who is left behind from 
the recovery process. Young citizens, a typically marginalized group, may become active once 
again in the face of these new difficulties. Social media and the Internet, which have become 
essential for many during this  time of  crisis, may once again play an important role in the 
activism that we see once the dust clears.   
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. ​Consent Statement and Interview Guide 
Hello! Thank you for choosing to participate in my research, which covers the topic of social media 
activism and youth identity. I am hoping to learn a little bit more about you and your relationship with 
politics and social media through this conversation. As a reminder, you are welcome to stop at any time and 
if you are uncomfortable with answering any question, please feel free not to answer. If you have any 
questions for me, you may stop me at any point. I will be recording our conversation so I can use it in my 
research. Would you like to proceed? 
 
1. How old are you?  
2. What year are you in university and what are you studying there? 
3. Do you live on your own or with your family? 
4. If your friends had to describe you in 3 words, how would they describe you? 
5. If your parents had to describe you in 3 words, how would they describe you? 
6. If a stranger, after having one initial conversation, had to describe you in 3 words, how would they 
describe you? 
7. If you had to describe yourself in 3 words, what would those words be? 
8. What social media platforms do you use?  
a. What are your main purposes for each social media platform? 
b. How much time a week do you spend on social media? 
9. If you were to describe what you usually post on social media how would you describe? 
10. How would you describe the content that you usually view on social media  
11. If someone who came across your social media profile had to describe you in 3 words, what would 
they say? 
12. If you had to describe yourself on social media in 3 words, what would they be? 
13. When you want political news/updates, what sources do you use? 
14. Do you use social media to get political updates? When and where? 
15. Describe your involvement with politics 
a. Voting, protests, activism  
16. What are your feelings towards those who comment on the regime on social media? 
a. Do you see a lot of this? From who? 
 








Figure 2. ​Indicate how important it is in your life: FAMILY 
Figure 3. ​Indicate how important it is in your life: POLITICS 























































Figure 11. ​Rating of political systems: DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM 
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